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THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S MENS REA REQUIREMENT:
ESTABLISHING A "BRIGHTER LINE" TEST
United States v. Sinskey'
by Douglas L. McHoney

I. INTRODUCTION
ThisEighth Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision is a case of first
impression in its jurisdiction and
examines the mens rea requirement
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The Eighth Circuit avoids the difficulties other jurisdictions have encountered when interpreting the
"knowingly" requirement by developing a "brighter line" test. As a
result ofthis "brighter line" test, both
companies and the officers who
work for them will have major incentives to avoid violations of the
CWA while still maintaining protection from over prosecution.
H. FACTS AND HOLDING
John Morrell & Co.

("Morrell"), a large meat-packing
plant in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
created a substantial amount of
wastewater throughout the packaging process.2 Some of this wastewater went to a sewage treatment
plant, and the rest was treated at
Morrell's own wastewater treatment plant ("WWTP").3 The primary function of the WWTP was
to decrease the amount of ammonia nitrogen in the water before it
discharging it into the river.4
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") issued a permit for the WWTP under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"), requiring the
company to not only limit the
amount ofthe ammonia nitrogen to
specified levels, but also to perform
weekly tests monitoring the
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amounts.- IHe permit also required
that Morrell file monthly dischargemonitoring reports concerning the
results ofthese tests.
In the spring of 1991,
Morrell doubled the number of
hogs slaughtered at the plant.' The
increase caused the level of ammonia nitrogen in the discharged water to exceed that allowed by the
CWA permit.' To compensate,
Morrell manipulated the testing process so that it would appear to be
within the permitted limits.'o One
technique employed was "flow manipulation" or the "flow game.""
The technique was to discharge low
levels before the weekly testing. 2
Once the tests were completed,
Morrell would discharge an exceedingly high level of ammonia nitrogen. '"

In addition, Morrell employed the "selective sampling"
technique." This involved performing more than the number of tests
required by the EPA, but only reporting those test results that reflected levels below the permissible
limits. " Finally, when either ofthese
techniques failed to produce ac-

'119 F.3d712 (8th Cir. 1997).
2
Sinskey, 119 F.3dat 714.
3Id After the water was treated at the WWTP the water was dumped into the Big
Sioux River. Id.
4
id
'33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387(1998).
6
Sinskey, ll9F.3dat714.
7
id.
8

Id.

9Id.

'0ld Ron Greenwood. the manager, and Barry Milbauer. the assistant manager, manipulated the testing process.
11Id.
"2Id.
" Id.
1

id.

" Id.
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ceptable results, Morrell simply falsified the tests' results and the
monthly EPA reports.' 6 Timothy
Sinskey signed these reports and
sent them to the EPA.
As a result ofthese actions,
Sinskey, the plant manager, and
Wayne Kumm, the plant engineer,
were charged with criminal violations ofthe CWA. 7 The jury found
both Sinskey and Kumm guilty of
knowingly rendering an inaccurate
monitoring method required under
the CWA." The jury also found
Sinskey guilty of knowingly discharging a pollutant into waters in
amounts exceeding those permitted
by the CWA.'9 Both men appealed
their convictions to the Eighth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals.20
Sinskey and Kumm based
their appeal on several issues."

First, the trial court gave an instruc-

tion that for the jury to find that

Sinskey had acted "knowingly," the
government must have shown that
Sinskey was "aware of the nature
of his acts, peform[ed] them intentionally, and [did] not act or fail to
act through ignorance, mistake or
accident."n Further, the instructions
told the jury that Sinskey did not
have to know that his acts violated
the CWA or permits issued under
that act.' Sinskey contended that
because the word "knowingly" immediately precedes the word "violates" in Section 1319(c)(2XA), the
government had to prove that he
knew his conduct violated the CWA
or the permit.24
Second, Sinskey and
Kumm challenged the trial court's
instructions with respect to their violation of Section 1319(c)(4).' The
men argued that the government

should have been required to prove
that they knew their acts were illegal."
The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in affirming the district
court's decision, held that the
"knowingly" requirement in both
statutes required only that Sinskey
and Kumm had knowledge of the
relevant activities, not that they
knew their activities violated the
law.27
MH.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Clean Water Act
In 1948, Congress first
provided funding to municipalities
in an attempt to control water pollution when it passed the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.28
Throughout the 1960's and 1970's,
as environmental awareness in-

'6 id.

18 1d The Court held that the men violated 13 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4).
19 Sinskev, 119 F.3d at 714. This was in direct violation of 13 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(a).
20
d
21 Id Sinskey appealed several other points beyond the scope of this Casenote. Sinskey
contended that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting Milbauer's secret logs because, he claimed, the logs did not meet the requisite standards of accuracy and reliability for scientific evidence. Id. at 717. Further, Sinskey asserted error in the trial court's
decision not to grant his motion seeking to limit the government's ability to cross-examine an unindicted co-conspirator.
Id Kumm also appealed several other points beyond the scope of this casenote. Kumm contended that the government's
evidence was insufficient to establish he affirmatively participated in the deceit either directly or by aiding and abetting
those who did. Id at 718. Kumm also asserted that the jury instructions were incorrect because he had no duty to report
the violations and to intervene to stop their continuation. Id. at 718-19. Kumm contended that the prosecutor's closing
argument alleged incorrectly certain legal duties of Kumm. Id. at 719. Finally, Kunm contended that the prosecutor
misstated the law in regards to the knowledge requirement. Id See infra note 26.
22 Sinskev. 119F.3dat715.
23 id.

Id See infra for the statutory
language.
2
1Id at 717.
24

26 id.

27Id. The

Eighth Circuit also held that admitting the secret logs was within the trial court's discretion. Id. In addition, the
Court held that because the witness could have invoked his fifth amendment privilege after direct examination, the trial
court did not error in denying Sinskey's motion to limit the government's ability to cross-examine. Id at 718. The Eighth

creased, the government introduced
regulations controlling the amount
of pollutants in waterways. 29 The
Clean Water Act, as it is now titled,
reached its current form after
amendments by Congress in 1972
and subsequently in 1977:1
The purpose of the CWA
was to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological
integrity ofthe Nation's waters."
The CWAuses a technology-based
approach where all discharges are
required to adhere to federal regulations. 2 The National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") is the centerpiece of
the regulatory scheme, regulating
the pollution through permits," The
NPDES requires that anyone dis-

charging pollutants into the nation's
waters must obtain a permit from

the EPA.' In order to implement
the standards stated in the CWA
and EPA regulations," the NPDES
limits the quantity or concentration
of pollutants a facility may discharge. 6 Within these regulations,
Congress provided methods of enforcement, which have become
more severe over the past several
decades, including civil, criminal and
administrative penalties, to help
reach the goals as provided in the
CWA. 37
B. The "Knowingly" Requirement
The mens rea element ofthe
CWA has caused controversy
throughout not only the court system, but also the entire environmental field. Section 1319(c)(2)(A)

CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
kmowingly violates.. this title, or any
pemit condition or limitation.. shall
be punished by a fine of not less
than $5,000 nor more than $50,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years,
or by both" (emphasis added)." In
Section 1319(c)(4), Congress
states that, "Any person who
Imowingly makes any false material statement, representation, or
certification in any application,
record, report... or other document
required to be maintained under this
chapter or who knowingly
falsifies... or renders inaccurate any
monitoring device...shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by imprisonment for
not more than 2 years or by both"
(emphasis added).'

provides that, "Any person who
Circuit also found that the evidence supported a verdict that Kunun aided and abetted the misleading monitoring scheme
by encouraging Greenwood to render inaccurate monitoring methods and discouraging him from complaining about it to
others at the WWTP Id. For these same reasons, the court found that the jury instructions regarding his duty to report
were not incorrect. Id at 719. Further, the court held that the prosecutor's closing arguments referred only to Kumm's job
duties, not legal duties. Id Finally, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the trial court's jury instructions limited any harm caused
by the prosecutor's misstated the law in regards to the knowledge requirement. Id
28 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat.
1155 (1948). The original statute has evolved through
numerous amendments. See infra note 30 and accompanying text for the most dramatic amendment.
29
See Patrick W. Ward, The CriminalProvisionsof the Clean WaterAct as Interpreted
by the Judiciaryand the Resulting Responsefrom the Legislature,5 DICK. J. ENvrL. L. & Pol'Y 399 (1996).
30

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 95-217, '2, 91 Stat. 1566. Codified
as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.
3133 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1972).
32

Mary J. Houghton, The Clean WaterActAmendments of 1987: A BNA SpecialReport,
ENV'T REP., Sept. 4. 1987, at 2.
33 Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the "HeightenedCriminalLiability" Imposed on Holators
ofthe Clean Jtater

Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J.377,380 (1996).
3 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(c) (1997). 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) prohibits the discharge of "pollutants" into waters by any "person"
without an NPDES permit. "Person" includes any individual, corporation, municipality, or corporate officer. 33 U.S.C. §§
1319(c)(6), 1362(5). "Pollutant" refers to any solid and other waste, sewage sludge, heat, rock sand. biological and
radioactive materials. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
35 See
40C.F.R. §§ 131(1), 1221(a) (1994).
36
Wettach, supra note 33, at 380.
37
Houghton, supra note 32, at 15-16.
38 See Ward,
supra note 29, at 399.
39 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1997).
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1. Legislative History
Since Congress established
the CWA, the government has had
the power to impose criminal sanctions on violators." In 1972, Congress provided for enforcement of
penalties for willful or negligent violations ofthe CWA through penalties of $2,500 to $25,000 per day
of violation, prison sentences ofup
to two years, or both.42 In addition,
the government could require a person who knowingly made false
statements to pay a fine of up to
$10,000, serve up to six months in
jail, or both.43 However, Congress
recently amended the CWA to enhance these criminal provisions and
increase the criminal sanctions on
violators.4
The recent amendments to
the CWA have not only expanded
the behavior subject to criminal
penalties, but also increased the
severity of the penalties.' The
Water Quality Act Amendments of
1987 separated intentional and neg-

ligent violations and assigned different penalties to each,' Most significantly, Congress changed the
word "willfully" to "knowingly" in
order to classify the violations as
felonies.4 7 Because the use of the
term "willfilly" in a criminal statute
generally requires polluters to know
their conduct violated the law, the
change of the term reflects
Congress's desires to end this requirement." Consequently, the current tougher penalties increased
both the maximum fine and the
amount oftime that can be spent in
jail.49 Both Section 1319(c)(2)(A)
and 1319(c)(4) double the potential fines and prison time for a second offense. 0
The preamble to the 1987
amendments reveals Congress's
intent in amending the above provisions." The Senate Report stated
that "criminal liability shall also attach to any person who is not in
compliance with all applicable Federal, State and local requirements

and permits and causes a publicly
owned treatment works to violate
any effluent limitation or condition
in any permit issued to the treatment
works under section 402 of the
Act." 2 The House Report stated
that Congress intended to "amend
section 309 ofthe [CWA] to provide penalties for dischargers or individuals who knowingly or negligently violate or cause the violation
of certain of the Act's requirements." In ajoint conference report, the House and the Senate only
discussed the change in the criminal penalties caused by the amendments." The lack of an explanation
regarding the change in the
provision's language reflects
Congress's desire only to
strengthen the penalties and not alter the interpretation of the term
"knowingly.""
2. Public Welfare Offense
Doctrine
The public welfare offense

-o3 3 U.S. C.§ 1319(c)(4) (1997).
Wettacht
supra note 3w3h
at 38 1.
t
4'33 USC § 1319(c)(1) (1986).
4
11d. § 1319(c)(2).
4 H.R. Rep. No. 961. 104th Cong. (1987). Codified as amended at 33 U.S.C§§ 131 9(c)(2) and 13 19(c)(4).
SWettachi
supra note 3a3p.
at 3
461d.

at 382.

47

F1.

Water Quality Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-4. 101 Stat. 7 (198 7) amending 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
1 See United States v Hopkins, 53 F.3d 53 3, 539 (2d Cir 199 5); H.R. Couf. Rep. No. 1004,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 8(1986).
49
See supra notes 39 and 40. (33 U.S.C. §§ 13 19(c)(2)(A) and (c)(4). See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text for
4

the new increased amounts.
"033 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(2)(A)-(B), 1319(c)(4) (1998).
51 Wettach. supra note 33, at 389.
42 1d Citing S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., st Sess. 29(1985).

"Id, citing R Rep. No. 189, 99th Cong., st Sess. 29(1985).
4 , citing
H.R Conf. Rep. No. 10049. 9thCong. 2d Sess. (1986).
5Wettach,supra note 33, at 390.

doctrine states that knowledge of
the act itself is sufficient moral culpability for conviction under environmental regulations. 6 Neither
knowledge ofthe actual statute nor
knowledge of the existence of any
statute is required."
The principle case in this
area is United States v. InternationalMinerals& Chem. Corp."
The Supreme Court held that the
"knowingly" language required the
government to prove that the defendant knew of the nature of the
acts, not that the defendant knew
his actions violated the applicable
statute." The Court applied what
is known as the public welfare ofwhen it stated
fense doctrine
that "where... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnox-

ious waste materials are involved,
the probability of regulation is so
great that anyone who is aware that
he is in possession ofthem or dealing with them must be presumed to
be aware ofthe regulation."
3. Relevant Precedent
Appeals courts throughout
the nation have seen a variety of
cases pertaining to the mens rea element of the CWA.6' The courts
have consistently held that the
CWA's criminal enforcement provisions require only that polluters
knew of their actions, not the relevant law.62 More significantly, to
be guilty, these criminal defendants
did not need to act with a specific
intent to violate the law.6
The Eighth Circuit dealt
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with the issue of general versus specific intent when interpreting a
criminal statue in UnitedStates v.
Farrell." In Farrell,the Court analyzed a statute that penalizes anyone who "knowingly violates" a
statute that prohibits the transfer or
possession of an automatic
weapon.6 The court determined

that the term "knowingly" only applied to the conduct prohibited by
statute, not the illegal nature ofthe
activities." It was thus held that the
term "knowingly" modified the acts
constituting the underlying conduct,
thus not requiring the government
to prove that the defendant knew
his actions were illegal.67
In Ratzlaf v. United
States, the Supreme Court analyzed a "willful violation," thus dis-

6Brad A. Gordon, CriminalKnowledge and the New Clean Air Act: PotentialJudicialConstructions,25 ARIZ. ST. L.J.

427,437 (1993). The Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and the Federal Insecticide. Fungicide
and Rodentcide Act have provisions for "knowing" criminal violations that employ the public welfare offense doctrine.
Ward, supra note 28, at 406. For a complete historical perspective of the public welfare offense doctrine. See Katherine H.
Setness, Statutory Interpretationof Clean Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A) 's Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling the
Needs ofEnvironmentaland CriminalLaw, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 447, 459 (1996).
57

Gordon, supra note 55, at 437.
" 402 U.S. 558 (1971). The Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Federal Explosives Act, which imposes misdemeanor penalties on any individual who "knowingly violates any .. regulation" promulgated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission of the safe transportation of corrosive liquids. Id. at 559.
59

Id. at 565.
6 id.

See United States v. Schallom, 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993) ("'knowingly' means that the defendant acted voluntarily and
intentionally and not because of mistake, accident, or other innocent reason."); United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d 27 (1st
Cir. 1992) (regarding a violation of Section 1319(c)(3)(A)); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1991) (dealing with the pre-1987 amendment statute); United Statesv. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa.
1978) aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979) (permitted factual evidence to establish willful actions regardless of knowledge of
statute or that actions violated statute); and United States v. Hamel, 557 F.2d 107 (6th Cir 1977) (allowed circumstantial
evidence). For a complete analysis on these and other cases, see also Wettach, supra note 32, at 390-93.
62
Wettach, supra note 33, at 392.
61

63 id.

6"69 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1995) (analyzing a violation of 18 U.S.C.
65 Id.

6 Id.
67 id.

at 892-93.

§ 924(a)(2)).
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tinguishing itfrom the statute that is
the subject of this casenote. 6' The
Court held that the term "willfully"
required that the defendant be
aware of the illegality of his actions
in order for a crime to be committed.6' The Ratzlaf Court also held
that a term that appears in a statute
at more than one point should be
construed the same way each
time. 70
In United States v.
Ahmad, the Fifth Circuit held that
the environmental laws do not impose strict criminal liability.71 In
Ahmad, a convenience store owner
discharged gasoline into a city
sewer system. 72 At trial, the defendant asserted that he thought he was
discharging water, not gasoline, and
ultimately was not convicted.7 The
court reasoned that the Act "uniformly requires knowledge as to
each of the elements rather than
only one or two." The dourt concluded that to hold Ahmad guilty

would subject mere accidents or
other lawful conduct to harsh criminal penalties.

legislative history from the 1987
amendments.'
In United States v.
Hopkins, the Second Circuit made
4. Hopkins and Weitzenhoff
a decision pertaining to Section
Two recent Court of Ap- 1319(c)(2)(A) of the CWA.o In
peals cases in other districts have Hopkins, the defendant's corporaaddressed the precise issue pre- tion generated a substantial amount
sented the Sinskey case. The oftoxic waste water." Its NPDES
Weitzenhoff case regarded the permit required the corporation to
criminal charges oftwo officers who take samples ofthe water and send
ordered employees to pump waste them to an independent laboratory
activated sludge directly into the for analysis.' Hopkins instructed his
ocean on 40 different occasions in employees that ifthe levels did not
violation of Section 1319(c)(2)(A) meet the requisite standards, they
of the CWA." The Weitzenhoff should either not send the samples,
court held that it would impose take them the next day, or dilute
sanctions on a person "who know- them with water.83 The court relied
ingly engages in conduct that results upon the public welfare offense docin a permit violation, regardless of trine and prior examination ofenviwhether the polluter is cognizant of ronmental legislation under the
the requirements or even the exist- CWAin holding that the government
ence of the permit." The court only needed prove that Hopkins
based its decision on the public knew ofthe nature of his acts and
welfare offense doctrine as stated that he performed them intentionin InternationalMineralsand the ally, not that he knew the acts vio-

" 114 S.Ct. 655(1994) (pertaining to Section 5324 of the Money Laundering Control Act). For a detailed analysis ofthe
Ratzlafcase, see Setness, supra note 55, at 468.
' 9 Id at 657.
70

Id. at 660.
7 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996). For a comprehensive analysis of theAhmad case, see David Gerger, Fifth CircuitRejects

Strict Criminal Liabilitv for Pollution.34-JUN Hous. LAW. 32, (1997); Stanley A. Twardy, Jr. & Michael G. Considine,
fWhatlust One "Know To Be Convicted Under the Environmental Laws?, 11-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 48 (1997).
72

1d at 388.
1Id at 390.
' 4 Id at 388.
75 id.
7

76

United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993); United States v.Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995). For further

analysis and comparison see Ward, supra note 28, at 406, and Setness, supra note 55, at 481.
" JJkitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1281.
7
1Id. at 1284.

Id. at 1283-86.
s0 Hopkins. 53 F.3dat 534.
81
Id
7

82 Id

83 id

at 535.

lated the CWA."N
IV. INSTANT DECISION
U.S. v. Sinskey first

brought the issue of the definition
of "knowingly" in the CWA context to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals." Sinskey was found guilty
of knowingly discharging a pollutant into waters of the United States
in amounts exceeding CWA permit
limitations in violation of Section
1319(c)(2)(A)."6 Sinskey claimed
that a prerequisite to a conviction
was proving he knew his actions
violated either the CWA or the
NPDES permit." In deciding this
issue, the Eighth Circuit analyzed
generally accepted constructions of
the word "knowingly" in criminal
statutes, the CWA's legislative history, and other case history that has
addressed this issue. 88
The court first looked at

United States v. Farrell", an
Eighth Circuit decision analyzing the
"knowingly" element in a statute
governing illegal possession of a
machine gun.90 The Farrellcourt
held that the conviction did not require that the defendant knew that
his actions violated the law, only that
the defendant knowingly committed the act of transferring or possessing a machine gun." Based on
this logic, the court found that the
Section 13 19(c)(2(A) "knowingly"
requirement applied only to the underlying conduct prohibited by the
statute."
Next, the court addressed
the conduct that Sinskey must have
known was occurring. While the
court initially recognized that the
conduct required might appear to
be the violation of a permit limitation, this would require that Sinskey
knew of the permit limitation and

CWA's Mens Rea Reauirement
knew that he was violating it.' Instead the court reasoned that to violate a permit limitation, one must
engage in the conduct prohibited by
the statute." The court concluded

that the "permit is.. another layer of
regulation in the nature of a law, in
this case, a law that applies only to
Morrell."6 Because ofthis, the underlying conduct that Sinskey must
have known was that conduct prohibited by the permit.I
The Eighth Circuit said that
this interpretation comported with
our legal system's general rule that
ignorance ofthe law is no excuse."
Further, the court noted that this interpretation is consistent with past
Supreme Court interpretations of
statutes containing similar language
and structure.9
The court then addressed
the act's legislative history.'" The
Eighth Circuit noted that in 1987,

"Id. at 536-41.
" Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715.
86

id

87,d.
88 Id.

8969 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1995). The court also cited United States v Hem, 926 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1991).
9 Sinskey, 119 F. 3d at 715. The relevant machine gun possession statute was 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
9
1 Farrell,69 F.3d at 892-893.
92
Sinskey, 119F.3dat715.
9 id

94

id

95

Id.

96 id

Id The court said that, for example, Sinskey had to have known that Morrell was discharging ammonia nitrates that
were higher than one part per million. Id
9 8 Sinske.v,
119 F.3d at 716 (citing Cheekv. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604. 609. 112 L.Ed.2d617 (1991)).
9

9 Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716 (citing United States v. International Mineral & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558.91 S.Ct. 1697. 29
L.Ed2d 178(1971)). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
'"'Sinskey, 119F.3dat 716.
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Congress changed the word "will- distinguished Smskey's case from Ratzlaj v. United StatesII the
fully" to "knowingly".'Io It sought Ahmad, the Fifth Circuit case that Supreme Court ruled that a term
to broaden the application of the dealt with a mistake of fact defense, that appears in a statute more than
statute and ultimately increase de- not a mistake of law 0
once should be consistently conRegarding Sinskey and strued."'
terrence by strengthening criminal
sanctions for the violations.' 02 The Kumm's violation of Section
The Eighth Circuit Court of
court held that this change de- 1319(c)(4), the Eighth Circuit Appeals, affirming the district
creased the mens rea requirement noted that in the plain language of court's decision, held that the
from having acted with the knowl- the statute, the adverb "knowingly" "knowingly" requirement in both
edge that one's conduct violates the directly "precedes and explicitly statutes does not require that
law, to simply having acted with an modifies the verbs that describe the Sinskey and Kumm knew of the ilactivities that violate the act."1" As legal nature oftheir conduct, only
awareness of one's actions. 03
The Eighth Circuit next dis- a result of this language, the court that they were knowledgeable ofthe
cussed other courts' decisions on concluded that Sinskey and relevant activities. 1 14
the same issue. 10'1 The Court cited

both
Hopkins'"
and
Weitzenhoff0 as decisions that
were consistent with the court's in-

terpretation
of
Section
1319(c)(2)(A).' 0 7 The court also

Kumm's "knowingly" argument had
even less force.11 0 The court cited
several cases that support the argument that the term "knowingly"
only referred to knowledge of the
relevant activities."' Further, in

V. COMMENT
Since the amendments to
the CWA in 1987, the United
States Courts of Appeals have
heard three cases regarding the

'0 1Sinskey, 119F.3d at 716. See 133 Cong. Recd.H131 (daily ed. Jan. 7,1987) (statement of Rep. J.Howard), reprintedin
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5,28, and 33 U.S.C. § 1319, historical and statutory notes, 1987 amendment, at 197 (West supp. 1997).
' 02 Id See H.R Cont. Rep. No. 99-1004 at 138(1986) and S.Rep. No. 99-50 at 29-30(1985).
'o3 'Sinskev. 119 F.3d at 716. The court compared Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201, with InternationalMinerals,402 U.S. at 562-63.
The court also cited Babbittv. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687,696-97, 115 S.Q. 2407,2412, 132 L.Ed.2d
597(1995) and Hern, 926 F2d 767.
'0"Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716.
1o United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.denied, 516 U.S. 1072, 116 S.Ct. 773, 133 L.Ed.2d725
(1996).. See supranotes 79-83 and accompanying text.
' United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1283-86 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.denied, 513 U.S. 1128, 115 S.Ct. 939, 130L.Ed.2d
884 (1995). See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
07
Sinskev, 119 F.3dat 716.
08 Id (citing
United States v. Ahmad. 101 F.3d 386(5th Cir. 1996)). See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
'09 Sinskev. 119 F.3d at 717.
no Id.

"' Id (citingHopkins, 53 F.3d at 541, United States v. Enochs, 857 F.2d 491, 492-94 (8th Cir 1988), and United States v.
Udofot, 711 F2d 831. 837 (8th Cir. 1983).
12510 U.S. 135. 143. 114 S.Q. 655,660, 126 L.Ed2d615 (1994).
" 3 Sinskev, 119 F.3dat 717.
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mens rea requirement for Section
1319 of the CWA. United States
v. Sinskey presented an issue of
first impression to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. While prior
cases may have lacked in their reasoning and their application of legislative history and case precedence, Sinskey appears to use
sound logic while ultimately reaching a result that will further the goals
ofthe CWA.
While
both
the
Weitzenhoff and Hopkins decisions concurred that knowledge of
the law is not an essential element
to a prosecution under Section
.1319(c)(2)(A) of the CWA, the
cases have been criticized because
they fail to address the role of the
rule of lenity and its use in relationship to legislative history."' Specifically, T&Tetzenhoff was criticized for
citing another subsection of the
CWA and its lack of discussion of
the changes that the 1987 amendments had on the CWA." 6 The
Hopkins court, on the other hand,
did discuss the change of language
caused by the 1987 amendment, but
failed to explain how the change

should translate into the specific acts
to be proven."
In the Sinskey case, the
court used the legislative history,
specifically the 1987 amendment,
simply to establish that the term
"knowingly" means "acting with an
awareness of one's actions."" 8 The
court made no attempt to use the
legislative history to establish the
actions of which a defendant must
be aware.
Another noted fault of the
Weitzenhoff and Hopkins decisions was failing to consider
whether some CWA violations
might fall outside of the scope of
the public welfare offense doctrine."' A criticism was that the
cases were "impermissibly vague"
about the prima facia case that the
government must prove to sustain
a criminal conviction. 2 0 Both the
Wietzenhoff and Hopkins decisions failed to address whether
some CWA violations might fall
outside ofthe public welfare offense
doctrine.121
The Eighth Circuit, on the
other hand, is more deliberate in its
application of the public welfare

CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
offense doctrine. The court stated
that the InternationalMinerals
court focused on the nature of the
regulatory scheme at issue, noting
that where dangerous substances
are at issue, anyone dealing with
these substances should be presumed to be aware of the regulation.122 The Eighth Circuit thus concluded that such reasoning should
apply to the CWA, which regulates
the discharge into the nation's waters of such "obnoxious waste material" as the byproducts of slaughtered animals.123
The court protected the
public welfare offense doctrine's
far-reaching interest when it stated
that the doctrine should apply to the
CWA as a whole, because the Act
regulates the discharge of"obnoxious waste material"into the nation's
waters. More importantly, the specific language used in the casel 24
seemed to imply that any CWA violations would fall within the scope
of the doctrine.'5 The court's failure to address whether some violations might fall outside the scope
of the public welfare offense doctrine appears to be intentional, thus

115 Katherine H. Setness, Statutory Interpretationof Clean Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A) Knowledge Requirement:
Reconciling the Needs ofEnvironmental and CriminalLaw, 23 EcOLOGY L.Q. 447,482 (1996).
116id
117

d

"'Sinskey, 119F.3dat716.
119 Setness, supra note
120 id

115, at 482.

121

id
122 Sinskey,
123

'

24

119 F.3d at 716 (citing InternationalMinerals,402 U.S. at 558).

Id.

Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716. After reviewing the reasoning ofInternationalMinerals,402 U.S. at 558 (where the Court

held that where "dangerous or... obnoxious waste materials" are present, anyone dealing with the materials "must be
presumed" to be aware of such regulations), the Sinskey Court stated, "Such reasoning applies with equal force, we
believe, to the CWA, which regulates the discharge into the public's water of such 'obnoxious waste material' as the
byproducts of slaughtered animals." Id.
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allowing the inference that the doctrine covers all CWA violations.
Ultimately, the Court seemed to
avoid any "impermissibly vague"
language like that for which the other
cases have been criticized.
The Eighth Circuit also
stated that because of the public
welfare offense doctrine applied in
InternationalMineral, requiring
knowledge only of the underlying
actions would not raise substantive

rarely question Congress's power
to define mens rea in environmen- duct of which Sinskey must have
tal statutes and the criminal provi- had knowledge is the conduct that
sions used to enforce these stat- is prohibited by the permit, not the
utes. 29
terms of the permit itself 33 For
Finally, the Weitzenhoff example, Sinskey must only have
and Hopkins opinions also have been aware that Morrell's disbeen criticized for citing "a hodge- charges ofammonia nitrates were
podge of opinions with differing higher than one part per million in
definitions ofknowledge in support the summer of 1992.'" The court
of [their] holding[s]."' Obviously, determined that the government did
different definitions of knowledge not need to prove that Sinskey
due process issues.126 Constitu- would ultimately effect the burdens knew that his actions violated the
tional due process limits the ability of production and proof in a given CWA or NPDES permit, only that
of government to extend criminal case.13 1
Sinskey was aware of the underlysanctions over the conduct of citiWhile the Eighth Circuit ing conduct that resulted in violazens. 27 The CWA does not violate cites a variety of cases throughout tion of the permit.13 5 The Eighth
due process limits, because it has a its opinion to support different as- Circuit thus made the first step in
narrow definition ofwhat it consid- pects of its analysis, the court fo- the history of interpreting Section
ers criminal.'12 Further, because the cuses on the reasoning ofFarrell, 1319(c)(2)(A) in holding that the
conduct bears a substantial relation- a prior Eighth Circuit ruling.3 2 The mens rea element is satisfied ifthe
ship to legitimate public welfare, court uses the reasoning in Farrell defendant had knowledge of the
safety, and health concerns, courts to conclude that the underlying con- underlying conduct that is prohib125 The Hopkins Courts was criticized for stating that "the vast majority
of [substances regulated by the CWAJ are of the
type that would alert any ordinary user to the likelihood of stringent regulation," thus implying that some substances
would not alert the user about stringent regulation. Setness, supra note 55, at 482.
126 Sinskev, 119 F.3d at 716.
2
7 Wettach, supra note 33. at 397.
12 8 d
129

Id

Setness, supra note 115, at 483. Specifically, Setness states that Hopkins makes no distinguish between
cases that
require "knowledge of the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal", knowledge of "the nature of his acts", and
knowledge "that he was discharging the pollutants in question, and knowledge that he "was aware of his acts". Id.
130

I31

Id.

132 Farrell,69 F.3dat
133 Sinskey.

891.

119 F3dat 715. The Court stated:
At first glance, the conduct in question might appear to be violating a permit limitation, which would imply that §
1319(c)(2)(A) requires proof that the defendant knew that he or she was violating it. To violate a permit limitation,
however, one must engage in the conduct prohibited by that limitation. The permit is,in essence, another layer of
regulation in the nature of a law, in this case, a law that applies only to Morrel. Id

3-Id.at

715-16.

ited by the statute or regulations.
The court then applied this
logic and that ofRatzlafto Section
1319(c)(4). 1 6 The Court held that
"knowingly" refers to knowledge of
the relevant activities, specifically
"the defendants' knowledge that
they were rendering the monitoring
methods inaccurate by aiding and
abetting in the flow games and selective sampling."' 3 As a result of
this, the Eight Circuit established a
"brighter line" test for both Sections
1319(c)(2)(A) and 1319(c)(4). In
the Eighth Circuit, prosecutors who
file these charges and the defendants that these charges are brought
against will have less ambiguities
when faced with allegations of
criminal violations of the CWA.
As a result of these recent
decisions regarding the CWA, academics have argued that prosecutors are now armed with "a new
arsenal offelony level environmental crimes and accompanying sanctions" that can be considered "effective weapons against recalcitrant
environmental violators." 3 8 While
some have argued that this puts too
much power in the hands of prosecutors, the EPA and the Department ofJustice's guidelines in case
selection help protect people engaging in truly innocent conduct
6Id at 717.

3

from criminal prosecution. '
In addition, because of the
narrowed ruling in Sinskey and the
"brighter line"test established within
the decision, corporate officials will
have a greater incentive to not only
learn but also follow the rules established by the CWA and the
NPDES. The criminal sanctions that
can be imposed on officers and corporations provide protection from
abuse by companies that simply pay
civil penalties as a cost of doing
business. The corporate officers
who permit or simply allow these
violations to take place will potentially face criminal sanctions. This
will ultimately deter companies from
participating in activities that can
harm the nation's waterways, without exposing these companies to
undue risk from overzealous prosecutors.

CWA's Mens Rea Requirement
1319(c)(4) of the CWA. Consequently, corporations and their officers will have incentives to follow
the laws established by the CWA
and its regulations or risk severe
criminal sanctions.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's ruling
in Sinskey was based on sound
logic in its analysis of relevant case
law, legislative history, and general
policy issues. Because ofthis sound
logic, the Eighth Circuit established
a "brighter line" test than other jurisdictions have established in their
analysis ofthe mens rea requirement
in Sections 1319(c)(2)(A) and

37 id

John Gibson, The Crime of "Knowing Endangerment" Underthe CleanAirAct Amendments of1990: Is itAlfore
"Bark Than Bite" as a Watchdog To Help Safeguarda Workplace FreeFrom Life ThreateningHazardousAir Pollution
Releases, 6 FORDHAM EVNTL. L.J. 197, 201 (1995).
138

See Wettach, supra note 33, at 398 for a complete analysis of prosecutorial discretion through EPA and Department of
Justice guidelines.
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